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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ELSA B. MICHAEL, and BEVERLY
S. CLENDENIN and ELSA B.
MICHAEL,
Trustees of a trust for the use and

benefit of HELEN B. BEHAL,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
SALT LAKE INVESTMENT
COMPANY, an expired Utah

Case
No. 9034

corporation, and Salt Lake
Investment Company, a Utah
corporation,

Defendants and Appellants
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action to quiet title, brought by plaintiffrespondents to quiet their title against the defendants~ap
pellants to lots numbered 22 through 27 in Folsom's
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Addition, in North Salt Lake, Salt Lake County, Utah
(Rec. 1-3) . Respondents further allege continuow,
notorious, exclusive adverse possession of said premises and
each and every part thereof for over twenty years (Complaint, page 2, Rec. 2), but did not allege against whom
said alleged adverse possession was maintained for said
period.
Appellants-defendants claim under a tax deed issued
September 22nd, 1909 by the Salt Lake County Auditor,
which tax deed was based on sale for delinquent 1896 taxes,
sold to M. C. Moon and the sale certificate assigned to
Salt Lake Investment Company (Complaint, paragraph
2, page 2, Rcc. 2; Answer, first part second defense, Rec.
4; Exhibit "8"; Page 24, page 11, of Exhibit "I").

In support of the claim of respondent-plaintiffs'
allegations of adverse possession, H. L. Balser, one of their
witnesses, testified that from 1917 onward to about 1935
(Tr. 10, Rec. 23, Tr. 14, Rec. 27) the lots in question
were used as a storage yard for railroad ties of the Bamberger Railroad (who was not an owner or in the chain
of title) under an oral permit or license. Witness had no
knowledge of the exact bounds of the lots as same were
not staked on the ground (T r. 21, Rec. 34), and, an adjacent street called Chestnut Street, and, an alley, were
not specifically delineated either (Tr. 20, Rec. 33, Tr. 21,
Rec. 34.) further, the property in question was thereafter included in a lease to Wendell Wagstaff, following
closely on the conclusion of the tie storage situation, said
lease being an oral lease (Tr. 37, Rec. 50), but which was
not included in the written lease until about April 16th,
1949 (Exhibit 5). The lessee used the parts of the
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ground for bulk oil storage and transfer to smaller containers, and later for some salvage storage and sorting of
war surplus items (Tr. 17, Rec. 30, Tr. 18, Rec. 31).
Rental was collected from the Wagstaff people, but it
was not separately itemized or stated as to the particular
lots involved in this suit, but covered the rental on other
ground, not in question here, as well (Tr. 22, Rec. 35, Tr.
32, Rec. 45). The area has since been used as a parking lot
for lessee's tankers, and the tankers of lessee'~ customers
(Tr. 27, Rec. 40), and is an open area, which has had some
gravel placed upon it (T r. 2 5, Rec. 3 8) , and is unfenced
(Tr. 23, Rec. 36, Tr. 24, Rec. 37).
Another of plainiff-appellants' witnesses, Donald
H. \\;'agstaff, testified as to alleged usages of the ground
from the initiation of his lease, in first putting a two to
three inch pipeline across lots 22, 23, and 24 (Tr. 42,
Rec. 55) placing oil storage drums and filling smaller
containers from the drums (Tr. 42, Rec. 55), together
with some U'>agc by his transports or trucks (T r. 53, Rec.
56), conducting a salvage operation on used government
materials, bailing and disposing of same (Tr. 50, Rcc. 63Tr. 62, Rcc. 65), and later making a parking lot of much
of the area (Tr. 54, Rec. 67-Tr. 63, Rcc. 76). Plaintiffs and respondents, paid all taxes since 1957, and prior
taxes were paid by the Simon Bamberger Company back
to 1924 (Tr. 16, 17, Rec. 29, 30, Exhibit "6").
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
FINDINGS OF FACT MUST NOT BE BARE CONCLUSIONS.
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POINT II
RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED ACTS OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION INSUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH LAW.
POINT III
RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS' 1906 TAX DEED
WAS INVALID BOTH AS TO FORM AND IN LAW.

POINT IV
APPELLANTS AS COTENANT$ ARE UNAFFECTED
BY RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED ACTS OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION.

POINT V
RESPONDENTS MUST RECOVER ON STRENGTH
OF THEIR OWN TITIE,

ARGUMENT
POINT I
FINDINGS OF FACT MUST NOT BE BARE CONCLUSIONS:
Plaintiff-respondents' findings of fact in paragraph
I (Rec. 90-91) "conclude" that "plaintiffs are the legal
tide holders of the realty described," and in paragraphs
5 and 6(Rec. 92) again "conclude" that the acts of occupancy of plaintiff-respondents were "open, notorious,
hostile, adverse, continuous and exclusive as to all persons,
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including defendants" and was for the "ordinary use" of
the occupant.
Such statements, are not, within the rules applicable
to findings of fact as used in this jurisdiction, acceptable
forms for, or findings of actual, material facts, but are
mere bald conclusions of law, and, to the extent that the
decree rests or purports to rest- upon them, cannot be
predicated on such findings.
The general rule as to findings of fact is well stated
in 53 American Jurisprudence, Section 113 8, on page 794,
as follows:

"Propositions which are in reality conclusions
of law cannot be given effect as findings [of fact]
even though included with findings of fact ..... "
Utah rules relative to the above are well stated in the
following excerpts from case~:
[9-10] The findings of the court that the shares
of stock transferred .... were transferred in contemplation of the death of decedent and not to
take effect until at or after his death, being found
merely in the language of the statute, . . . . . . are
mere conclusions of law without any facts found
to support them. Our statute, requires the facts
found and the conclusions of law to be separately
stated and unless that is done and all material facts
found as disclosed by the evidence which in the
judgment of the court and counsel have a bearing
on the question as to what that judgment should
be, nothing more is accomplished than by a mere
general verdict, and the wholesome purpose of the
statute aforesaid requiring findings and conclusions
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to be separately found and stated [is thwarted]
. . . . . Real requirement of the statute is just as
essential in equity a~ in law cases. A judgment
rendered on no findings, or not upon sufficient or
proper findlngs to support it, has no more validity
in equity than in law."- In Rc Thompson's Estate, 269 Pac 103,72 Utah 35, at page 109 Pacific.

" [ 2-3] It is obvious that the court did not find all
the material issues raised by the complaint. . . . .
The rule with respect to the making of findings
which has been adopted and followed in this jurisdiction is stated in Dillon Implement Company vs
Cleveland, 32 Utah 1, 88 Pac. 670-1, as follows:
'The law is well settled that the findings must be
within the issues when compared with the pleadings and must respond to and cover the material
issues raised by the pleadings ..... No judgment
can properly be rendered until there is a finding
upon all the material issues. See West vs. Standard
Fuel Company (Utah), 17 Pac 2nd 291 (292).Thomas vs. Farrell, 26 Pac. 2d 328, 82 Utah 535,
at pages 330-1.
The above "conclusions" contained in the findings
of fact, as such, as well as when considered in connection
with the other facts of the case, and the arguments elsewhere presented herein, cannot stand either as YJ!id
findings of fact, nor, as being predicated upon any of the
evidence adduced here. Being wholly unsupportable,
they fall, and with them, the plaintiff-respondents' case.

POINT II
RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED ACTS OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION INSUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH LAW.
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(A) No evidence in this case was adduced to show
that there was any actual possession by the respondents
or their predecessors during the period 1898-1917, or,
indeed that respondents did anything in or upon the lots
in question, at all, for this period of some 19 years.
(B) The evidence as to the alleged "adverse" possession from 1917 to 1935, consists in the acts of a stranger

to the title, the Bamberger Electric Railroad or the Bamberger Railroad Company, in storing tics on the lots, or
parts of the lots in question. Certainly, under the rules
laid down in Day vs. Steele, 184 Pac 2nd 216, Ill Utah,
224, there was no "cultivation or improvement" of the
land, it was not "enclosed", used for "fuel supply" or
for "fencing timber", purposes of "husbandry", "pasturage', or, for the "ordinary use of the occupant" as that
terms has been defined. Nothing in the acts of the
railroad amounted to "adverse" possession, especiJ.Jly, since
the ties were being stored all over the area, and on other
lots belonging to the respondent-plaintiffs.
(C) The usages of the lessees (\Wagstaffs) of the
property from 1935 onward did not constitute "improvements", as they put nothing en which were changes of a
"substantial" or "permanent" nature, and such as remained
visible for the period of the claimed statute of limitations.
Nor docs the ''ordinary use of the occupant" help in this
instance, either, for the alleged uses were temporary placing of oil storage drums, salvage material, and later usc
for parking lot for transient customer trucks. These
usages, when considered in the light that adjacent property
was being used likewise by the lessees for the same purpose, may be considered a mere "overflow" onto these
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lots, such as any and many persons do, as where there is
vacant adjacent ground onto which they can encroach.
Certainly, nothing in the usages mentioned, are such as
to indicate a manifest intention on the part of plaintiffrespondents to oust defendant-appellants, and, certainly,
are not compatible with a claim of exclusive, adverse,
hostile, possession, as against all the world. These usages
are no more adverse than was the usage in Perry Estate
vs Ford, 46 Utah 346, 151 Pac. 59, where leaving wagons,
and throwing refuse, even coupled with payment of
taxes, was insufficient to establish adverse possession.
The mentioned portion of findings l, 5, 6, cannot be
sustained or supported on the basis of the actual evidence
relating to the alleged adverse possession, either in fact or
in law.
POINT III
RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSOR'S 1906 TAX DEED
WAS INVALID BOTH IN FORM AND IN LAW.
Plaintiff-respondents rely, in part at least, upon
quit-claim deed from Salt Lake County to Simon Bamberger dated May 7th, 1906 (Exhibit "2", Page 23, Exhibit "1"), based on tax sales apparently made in connection with delinquencies for 1897-8, as being part of
their title. They can place no reliance upon same, for it
appears that the deed is of no effect.
It appears from the abstract of tide (Exhibit 1,
Page "11", and Ex:hibit "8") that there were outstanding
taxes for the year 1896, prior to the the purported commissioners' sale resulting in the 1906 deed to Simon
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Bamberger. Any such sale of land for subsequent taxes,
while the prior tax is outstanding and unpaid, is improper,

if not absolutely illegaL See the case of Board of Com'rs
of Sedgwick County vs Connors ct a! 245, Pac. 1030, 121
Kan. 105, wherein the Court stated:
"In this case the county treasurer transcended his
authority when he accepted money for the delinquent taxes of 1915, while at the same time he
ignored the county's lien for the earlier delinquent
taxes of 1914. 1'\o such prerogative is vested in the
county treasurer".
Nor was there any such prerogative vested in the
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County. And the
court in the Sedgwick case, supra, properly noted that the:
"whole matter of taxation, including the powers of the taxing authority to deal with property
on which taxes are n<Jt paid, and to conserve the
public's revenue affected thereby, is governed ....
by statutes ..... "
Utah Laws of 1896, in the so-called Revenue Act,
page 450, states:
"Section 92: Every tax has the effect of a
judgment against the person, and every lien created
by this act has the force and effect of an execution
duly levied against all personal property of the
delinquent. The judgment is not satisfied nor the
lien removed until the taxes are paid, or the property sold for the payment thereof."
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Certainly appellants' lien for the 1896 taxes continued in force, even after respondents' predecessors attempted to take up the 1897-8 tax lien in 1906, and, when
the property which is subject to this suit was sold in 1909,
to appellants, then this lien was foreclosed, title of respondents' predecessor divested, and such title vested in the appellant, where it remains, undisturbed and undivcsted.
Section 146 of the Revenue Act of 1896 (Page 460,
Laws Utah, 1896) provides that property shall be continued to be assessed after the first year's sale for taxes,
but not to be sold again, while the redemption for the
previous sale may be made. And Section 147 of the
Revenue Act of 1896 (Page 460, Laws of Utah, 1896),
provided no final sale under the law was to be made,
in event there were (as here) unredeemed prior taxes,
un!css exPressly permitted by the Board of [County]
Commissioners. No authority for the final sale was
shown here by virtue of any board order permitting
the county to take title.

Neither does the deed to Simon Bamberger dated
May 7th, 1906, conform to the mandate of Section 123
of the Revenue Act of 1896, (Page 456, Laws Utah,
1896), in that it (Exhibit "8") fails to recite "substantially the amount of the tax for which the property was
sold, the year for which is was assessed, the day and
year of sale, and the amount for which the real estate was
sold."
The quitclaim deed (Exhibit 8) to Simon Bamberger
fails in both its legal effect, and in its form, and is manifestly invalid.
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POINT IV
APPELLANTS AS COTENANTS ARE UNAFFECTED
BY RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED ACTS OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION.
Even conceding, momentarily, for the sake of argument, the validity of the 1906 tax deed to Simon Bamberger, the effect would be to make the appellant and
respondents' predecessor, Mr. Bamberger, tenants in common in the lots in question, since, they were both holding
tax deeds from the same taxing authority, and both of
which deeds were on a parity as to their lien or foreclosure
or conveyance rights.
What rule is applicable under the cotenancy doctrine: Section 54 American Jurisprudence, Volume 1,
Page 824, under title Adverse Possession states in part:
"Since acts of ownership which in the case of
a stranger would be deemed adverse, and appear as
disseisin, are in cases of tenants in common susceptible of explanation consistently with the real
title, they are not necessarily inconsistent with the
unity of possession existing under a co-tenancy
. . . . . Accordingly, it is a general rule that the
entry of a co-tenant on the common property,
even if he takes the rents, cultivates the land, or
cuts the wood and timber without accounting or
pay for any share of it will not be generally considered as adverse to his cotcnants and an ouster of
t heJil. • • • • •

,

Utah has recognized the rule, in such situations a~
were present in McCready vs Fredrickson, 41 Utah, 388,
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126 Pac. 316, where possession, fencing, usage, and payment of taxes were held insufficient to divest the cotenants' title.
Under this theory standing alone, the plaintiff-respondents failed to prove any adverse possession against
defendants-appellants, entitling them to be awarded a
decree, and clearly, the findings of the trial court are
umupported by the evidence as to this situation.

POINT V
RESPONDENTS MUST RECOVER ON
STRENGTH OF THEIR OWN TITLE.

THE

It is so well settled as to need no extensive citation,
to determine that in a quiet title action of this character
that the plaintiff should prevail, only on the basis of his
own claim of title, whether by adverse possession or otherwise, and, he must show a good title in himself to win,
which the plaintiffs here, as hereinabove illustrated have
failed to do, and not by showing any defects in the defendants' title. See Home Owners Loan Corporation vs
Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 Pac 2nd, 160. Here, all of
the plaintiff-respondents' attacks on defendant-appellants' title, do not suffice to bolster his own title by
making it any better, and, since plaintiff-respondent has
the burden of sustaining his contentions under these circumstances, it is submitted that in view of the situation
herein created, there is a failure of proof as to sustain
plaintiff-respondents' case. Defendant-appellants have
shown that plaintiff-respondents have no basis for quiet-
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ing title, and therefore it was error for the trial court to
have permitted a decree to be entered against defendant-

appellants herein.

CONCLUSION
It is therefore respectfully submitted, that the decision, findings, and decree of the trial court in favor of
the plaintiff-respondents are erroneous, for the various
reasons set out hereinabove in this brief, and, that the
plaintiff-respondents having failed to sustain the burden
of proof as to its contentions of adverse possession, its
case or cause of action must fail, and a reversal of the trial
court's findings, decision, and decree should be entered
herein, with costs to this appellant.
Respectfully submitted,

MIL TON V. BACKMAN, of
Backman, Backman & Clark,

Attorneys for DefemlanfsAppellallts,
1111 Deseret Building,
Salt Lake Gty 11, Utah
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